Re: Resolving the crypto duplicity...
From: Dag-Erling Smørgrav (des_at_des.no)
Date: 02/04/04
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To: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk> Date: Wed, 04 Feb 2004 15:01:31 +0100
Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk> writes:
> I would like to propose that we try to eliminate the private copies
> of crypto functions in sys/opencrypto and instead focus on the
> copies in src/crypto as our "generic" implementations.
>
> Are there any technical or political reasons why we should not do this ?
I'm not sure how well-tested the KAME code is. For instance, until
recently, src/sys/crypto/md5.c used a static buffer as temporary
storage on big-endian systems, making it non-reentrant.
DES
-- Dag-Erling Smørgrav - des@des.no _______________________________________________ freebsd-arch@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-arch To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-arch-unsubscribe@freebsd.org"
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