[Fwd: NetBSD Security Advisory 2004-006: TCP protocol andimplementation vulnerability]

From: Andre Oppermann (andre_at_freebsd.org)
Date: 04/22/04

  • Next message: Barney Wolff: "Re: [PATCH] First part of TCP-MD5 inbound verification"
    Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 18:03:54 +0200
    To: current@freebsd.org, net@freebsd.org, security@freebsd.org
    
    
    

    FYI

    
    

    attached mail follows:


    Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 15:16:36 +0200
    To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
    
    

    The additional implementation flaw of BSD based TCP/IP stacks has
    been fixed in FreeBSD in revision 1.81 of tcp_input.c in 1998 for
    FreeBSD 2.2 and 3.0 and all releases since about six years ago.

    -- 
    Andre
    NetBSD Security-Officer wrote:
    > 
    > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    > 
    >                  NetBSD Security Advisory 2004-006
    >                  =================================
    > 
    > Topic:          TCP protocol and implementation vulnerability
    > 
    > Severity:       Serious (TCP disconnected by malicious party, unwanted data
    >                 injected into TCP stream)
    > 
    > Abstract
    > ========
    > 
    > The longstanding TCP protocol specification has several weaknesses.
    > (RFC793):
    > 
    > - - fabricated RST packets from a malicious third party can tear down a
    > TCP session
    > - - fabricated SYN packets from a malicious third party can tear down a
    > TCP session
    > - - a malicious third party can inject data to TCP session without much
    > difficulty
    > 
    > NetBSD also had an additional implementation flaw, which made these
    > attacks easier.
    
    

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