[Fwd: NetBSD Security Advisory 2004-006: TCP protocol andimplementation vulnerability]

From: Andre Oppermann (andre_at_freebsd.org)
Date: 04/22/04

  • Next message: Barney Wolff: "Re: [PATCH] First part of TCP-MD5 inbound verification" 
    Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 18:03:54 +0200
To: current@freebsd.org, net@freebsd.org, security@freebsd.org

    FYI

    attached mail follows:

    Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 15:16:36 +0200
To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com

    The additional implementation flaw of BSD based TCP/IP stacks has
    been fixed in FreeBSD in revision 1.81 of tcp_input.c in 1998 for
    FreeBSD 2.2 and 3.0 and all releases since about six years ago. 

    -- 
Andre
NetBSD Security-Officer wrote:
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> 
>                  NetBSD Security Advisory 2004-006
>                  =================================
> 
> Topic:          TCP protocol and implementation vulnerability
> 
> Severity:       Serious (TCP disconnected by malicious party, unwanted data
>                 injected into TCP stream)
> 
> Abstract
> ========
> 
> The longstanding TCP protocol specification has several weaknesses.
> (RFC793):
> 
> - - fabricated RST packets from a malicious third party can tear down a
> TCP session
> - - fabricated SYN packets from a malicious third party can tear down a
> TCP session
> - - a malicious third party can inject data to TCP session without much
> difficulty
> 
> NetBSD also had an additional implementation flaw, which made these
> attacks easier.

    _______________________________________________
    freebsd-net@freebsd.org mailing list
    http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-net
    To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-net-unsubscribe@freebsd.org"

  • Next message: Barney Wolff: "Re: [PATCH] First part of TCP-MD5 inbound verification"

    Relevant Pages