RE: rfc2385 support

Mathias_at_TeleCity.com
Date: 06/01/05

  • Next message: Christian Brueffer: "Re: The performances of OpenKeta@FreeBSD v0.8-alpha"
    Date: Wed, 1 Jun 2005 08:44:38 +0100
    To: <lee@wildcard.net.uk>, <freebsd-net@freebsd.org>
    
    

    Thanks for the info. I'm currently rebuilding the kernel on FreeBSD5.4
    with FAST_IPSEC and TCP_SIGNATURE added to options and crypto added to
    device. Will post the result.
     
    Regards,

    ________________________________

    From: Lee Johnston [mailto:lee@wildcard.net.uk]
    Sent: Sunday, May 29, 2005 12:50 PM
    To: Mathias Kenfack-Tabakem (LON); freebsd-net@freebsd.org
    Subject: Re: rfc2385 support

    Hi Mathias,

    I've managed to get Quagga + FreeBSD 4.x/5.x to establish BGP sessions
    with Cisco routers with MD5 password authentication.

    You'll need to ensure you build Quagga with MD5 support (the current
    port gives you the option during build), compile your kernel with
    relevant TCP_SIGNATURE and crypto support (options vary depending on if
    your using 4.x/5.x), use setkey, and add the usual neighbor x.x.x.x
    password yyyy to Quagga.

    Let me know if you need any more info/help..

    Regards,
    Lee.

    At 11:20 29/05/2005, Mathias@TeleCity.com wrote:

            Hi guys,
            
            I'm trying to find out if any release of FreeBSD supports MD5 as
    per
            rfc2385. I will be using it with quagga on BGP session
    authentication.
            
            Regards
            Mathias,
            
            
            
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  • Next message: Christian Brueffer: "Re: The performances of OpenKeta@FreeBSD v0.8-alpha"

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