Re: possible solution to cdbakeoven failing to detect ATAPI burners

From: Charles Howse (chowse_at_charter.net)
Date: 11/28/03

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    To: freebsd-questions@freebsd.org
    Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2003 15:22:48 -0600
    
    

    On Friday 28 November 2003 10:47 am, Lowell Gilbert wrote:
    > Charles Howse <chowse@charter.net> writes:
    > > No disrespect, but seriously, can you give me a scenario where something
    > > bad could happen on *my* computer because I'm running cdrecord suid-root?
    > >
    > > I would also be very interested to hear a scenario where something bad
    > > could happen on an insecure system if they are running cdrecord
    > > suid-root.
    >
    > This is a very important question indeed. The answer is kind of
    > complicated, because of course, if any such detailed scenario existed,
    > that would constitute a bug in cdrecord, and the immediate solution
    > would be to fix it. The problem comes from the reverse problem:
    > assuring yourself that no such bug exists.
    >
    > Because a negative proof is impossible, you want to reduce your
    > possible exposure to these problems where possible. This is why the
    > Cheswick, Bellovin, and Rubin book (http://www.wilyhacker.com/)
    > includes the principle of least privilege ("Don't give a person or
    > program any more privileges than those he needs to do his job.") as
    > one of the "security truisms" right up front.
    >
    > I should also note that the risk scenarios for your system involve not
    > just a problem with cdrecord, but also a way for a hostile user (or
    > program) to execute it, which would involve your system being at least
    > slightly penetrated to begin with. On a less secure system, the
    > hostile might actually have an account, and just being able to
    > interfere with some else's use of the CD drive would be a security
    > problem in its own right.
    >
    > > If I have more information on the implications of suid-root, I may be
    > > more careful in the future.
    >
    > In most cases, suid-root is used to make something more convenient
    > (ignoring the small number of actually essential cases in the base
    > system). Security is always a tradeoff with convenience, and only the
    > clinically paranoid choose security in every case.
    >
    > My logic for choosing security in this case is that cdrecord can be
    > exactly as convenient to use without root privileges; it's not a
    > blanket opposition to suid-root binaries.
    >
    > > Actually, I got my idea from man cdrecord, where it says:
    > >
    > > If you don't want to allow users to become root on your system,
    > > cdrecord may safely be installed suid root. This allows all users
    > > or a group of users with no root privileges to use cdrecord. Cdrecord
    > > in this case checks, if the real user would have been able to read
    > > the specified files. To give all user access to use cdrecord, enter:
    > >
    > > chown root /usr/local/bin/cdrecord
    > > chmod 4711 /usr/local/bin/cdrecord
    > >
    > > To give a restricted group of users access to cdrecord enter:
    > >
    > > chown root /usr/local/bin/cdrecord
    > > chgrp cdburners /usr/local/bin/cdrecord
    > > chmod 4710 /usr/local/bin/cdrecord
    > >
    > > and add a group cdburners on your system.
    >
    > Yes; in fact, cdrecord has been audited, albeit not nearly as
    > carefully as critical system programs, so there is a bit more reason
    > to trust it than the run-of-the-mill program.
    >
    > Also note the difference between the two approaches described there.
    > In the second, only limited users have permissions to run the program;
    > this means that a vulnerability in your web server wouldn't give
    > access to cdrecord to anybody on the Internet (assuming, of course,
    > that your web server doesn't run as root).
    >
    > Aside from the book I mentioned before, I recommend the man page for
    > security(7) as a pretty good introduction to the concepts of handling
    > privilege. Both references are quite good at avoiding overweaning
    > paranoia, which is a very common problem with security advice.

    This is excellent foor for thought! I'm going to audit my security policy for
    the lan here at home, and will make a note to remind myself to be sure to
    explain that not everything I do here at home is suitable for the corporate
    SA.

    -- 
    Thanks,
    Charles
    http://howse.homeunix.net:8080
    Random Murphy's Law:
    If you can get the faulty part off, the parts house
    will have it back-ordered.
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