Re: who flags on OSR5




----- Original Message -----
From: "Jeff Hyman" <scolist@xxxxxxxxxx>
Newsgroups: comp.unix.sco.misc
To: <distro@xxxxxxx>
Sent: Tuesday, March 21, 2006 3:54 PM
Subject: who flags on OSR5


# uname -X
System = SCO_SV
Release = 3.2v5.0.6
KernelID = 2000-07-27
Machine = Xeon

Does anyone have any ideas why the 'who' command would fail to show a
logged in user with command:

# who -f

yet the command:

# who -x
shows the user.
User is logged in on a ttyp*
--


I have no idea what the -f is supposed to do, or why. I read the man page
but that still doesn't clarify anything.
(what is a superfluous, non remote, pseudo tty user? who -h adds
superfluous to what the man-page says)
On a box with about 220 users, all but 5 remote in terms of being not within
the netmask of any nic, only one non-remote in terms of tcp vs serial or
console, who -f shows exactly one line, and it's not even myself (ssh on
ttyp50) but a console session on tty01.
Checking a few other smaller boxes shows almost the same thing.
Sometimes my own ssh session shows up, sometimes nothing at all is retruned
even though 20 or so mixed lan & wan users are logged in.

The boxes in question have users all on ttyp*, using a mix of facetwin and
openssh.
Point being that it's no particular server login daemon doing something odd
(or failing to do something) in utmp that who fails to parse.

I just tried rlogin from a remote box (via vpn) in to the 220 user box and
who -f shows my own ttyp55 of the rlogin session and the previously noted
tty01.

gwho (/usr/gnu/bin/who, if you have gnutools installed) does not appear to
have any analogous option.

Whatever it's supposed to do, I see no use for what it actually does.
I never used who -f but I do use who and who -ux and who -umx a lot.
who -umx is also part of a script I run in /etc/profile on all my boxes.

It's also always been true that who and w are only in sync with reality as
long as the various login daemons correctly update /etc/utmp & friends.
There are various ways utmp can find itself incorrect. I don't think this
issue is what you're after though. It's somewhat rare and the symptoms are
different anyways.
They (w, who) are only, and should only be used as, a convenience that is
usually right, not an authoritative/definitive source that can be 100%
relied on.
ps is the real authority.

--
Brian K. White -- brian@xxxxxxxxx -- http://www.aljex.com/bkw/
+++++[>+++[>+++++>+++++++<<-]<-]>>+.>.+++++.+++++++.-.[>+<---]>++.
filePro BBx Linux SCO FreeBSD #callahans Satriani Filk!

.



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